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Rosetta Stone Lid. respectfully submits this reply brief in support of its motion for partial 
summary judgment a; to liability. For the reasons that follow. Rosetta StOne's motion should be 
gnmted. 
INTRODUCTION 
Rosena Stone established that it is entitled to summHry judgment as to liability because 
there are no genuine issues of material fact as to Google's violations of the Lanham Act and 
Virginia law: 
• Google is directly liable for trademark infringement because Google uses the 
Rosetta Stone Marks 1 in a manner that is likely to confuse - and in fact has 
confused - consumers. 
• Google is liable for the trademark infringement of its customers because (i) it 
intentionally induces its customers to infringe the Rosetta Stone Marks. (ii) it 
continues to seU Sponsored Links to emitie3 that it knows are engaging in 
trademark infringement. iU'd (iii) it bas t.'1e legal right and practical ability to stop 
the infringing conduct yet fails to do so. 
Google is liable for trademark dilution because its conduct bas resulted in the 
blurring and tamisbnnent of the Rosetta Stone Marks. 
• Gocgle has been unjustly enriched because it knowingly uses and sells the Rosetta 
Stone Marks for its own profit without compensating Rosetta Stone. 
In its ·efforts to avoid summary judgment, Google overstates Rosetta Stone's claims. understates 
its own conduct, avoids the elements of trademark infringement and urges the Court to simply 
ignore the overwhelming evidence which establishes that confusion arises from Google's sale of 
the Rosetta Stone Marks as keywords. Ali discussed below. nDtwithstanding Google's attempts 
to blur the matters before the Court, application of governing law to the undisputed facts compels 
the conclusion that Rosetta Stone is entitled to summary judgment as to liability. 
The "Rosetta Stone Marks" include ROSETTA STONE. ROSETTA ,STONE LANGUAGE 
LEARNING SUCCESS. ROSETTASTONE.COM and ROSETT .... : WORLD. 
6628 
ARGUMENT 
l. ROSETTA STONE HAS PROVED DIRECT TRADEMARK LIABILITY 
To prove a claim for direc t infringement, Rosetta Stone must demonstrate that (I) it 
possesses the Rosetta Stone Marks; (2) Goo&lo used the Rosetta Stone Marks; (3) Google's use 
of the Marks occurred in commerce; (4) Google used the Marks in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods and services; and (5) Google used the 
Marks in a manner likely to confuse consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 1114; PETA v. Doughney, 263 FJd 
359,364 (4th Cir. 2001). 
A. Google Does Not Dispute That The First Four Elements Of A Trademark 
Infringement Claim Are Met 
Google does not dispute that the first four elements are met here. Nor could it. 
Numerous courts have held that Google's sale of trademarks as keywords constiMes a use in 
commerce in connection wi[h the sale, offering ior sale. distribution, or advertising of goods and 
services. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 fJd 123 (2d Cir. 2009); Google, fnc. v. 
Am. Blind & Wal/paper, No. C 03-5340 JF (RS), 2007 WL 1159950 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007); 
GElCO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (ED. Va. 2004). 
B. The Record Evidence Demonstrates That Google lises The Rosetta Stone 
Marks In A Manner Likely To Confuse Consumers 
The only open issue with respect to trademark infringement is whether Google used the 
Rosetta Stone Marks in a manner likely to confuse consumerS. See Reseuecorn, 562 F.3d at 130-
31 (stating that Lanham Act violation will lie if Google's use of trademark "in its AdWords 
program causes likel ihood of conBlsion or mistake" and denying motion to dismiss where 
likelihood of confusion was sufficiently alleged). Contrary to Google's assertion that Rosetta 
Stone has not met its burden, the record evidence establishes confusion in several ways. (See 
Dkt. 104, Rosetta Stone Mem. at 17-24.) 
'2 
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1. Rosetta Stone Properly Defined Its Confusion Burden 
First, Google argues that "Rosetta Stone's theor,! of direct liability against Google is 
premised on initial interest confusion," which Google asserts is not actionable in this Circuit. 
(Dkt. 153, Opp'n. at 9-12.) Google's argument is flawed in two ""spects. As a threshold matter, 
the likelihood of confusion established in Rosetta Stone; s motion for partial summary judgment 
is not initial interest confusion but the likelihood that Google's use of the Rosetta Stone Marks 
'\\'iU"ccnfuse an 'ordinary consumer' as to the source or sponsorship of the goods.'" PET.4,263 
F.3d at 366. As explained below, Rosetta Stone has carried its burden wi,h respect to this issue. 
Accordingly, Google's interjection of the initial interest confusion theory is largely beside the 
• 2 pomt. 
In addition, while the Fourth Circuit d.eclincd to endorse the initial interest confusion 
theory in Lampare/[o v. Falwell, it has not rejected il. 420 F.3d 309, 316-18 (4th Cir. 2005). In 
fact, the Lamparello court discussed at some length initiahnterest confusion, explaining that the 
doctrine applies only in cases involving '~one business's use of another's mark for its own 
financial gain" and therefore would provide no basis for liability in the case before it. Id at 317. 
In analyzing cases that have adopted the doctrine, the Lamparello court recognized that the 
appellate courts "have only applied it to profit-seeking uses of another's mark" whereas "the 
district courts have not so limited the application of the theory." Id at 318 n.6. The court stated 
its view that the district court cases Cly.. .. ere wrongly decided," but did not criticize or question the 
appellate ccurt decisions. Thus, while Lampwello declined to endorse the initial interest 
confusion doctrine on the fact. before it, the court's analysis leaves open the question whether 
2 Indeed, notwithstanding Google's stetemem at page 9 that Rosetta Stone's theory of direct 
Liability is premised on initial interest confusio£b Google subsequently states that "the 
confusion at issue in this case is confusion as to source of goods." (Opp 'n at 18 n.s.) 
3 
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the doctrine applies to cases, such as this one, where the defendant uses the plaintiffs mark for 
its own financial gain.3 As the Fourth Circuit recognized, numerous coorts have adopted the 
doctrine in such circumstances. See Lamparello, 520 F.3d at 317 (citing PACAA.R Inc. v. 
Telescan Techs. , LL.C. , 3 19 F.3d 243 , 253 (6th Cir.· 2003), and Promalek Indus., LId v. 
Equilrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002»; see also Playboy Enlers., 111c. v. Ne/scape 
Commcn's Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024·25 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying initial interest confusion to 
claim by markholder against internet search engine that sold plaintiffs mark as a keyword to 
third parties); GEICO v. Google, Inc. , No. I :04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 
8, 2005) (applying initial interest confusion to claim by marv.holder against Google based on 
Google's sale of plaintiffs mark as a keyword to third parties). 
2. Confusion Is Presumed As A Matter Of Law 
Google also argues that confusion cannot be presumed because the presumption 0 f 
confusion tbat arises when a defendant intentionally copies a protected mark applies only "where 
the defendant intentionally copies the plaintiffs mark for its use Dn its own competitive product'i 
with the intent to confuse or deceive the public." (Opp'n at 12.) Neither of tbe cases cited by 
Google supports such a limited view of this presumption. Shakespeare Company v. Sils/ar 
Corporation of America expressly states that the presumption arises "when the copier intends 10 
exploit the good will created by an already registered trademark." 110 F.3d 234, 237 (4tb Cir. 
2007) (quotation omilted). Here, the record demonstrates that Google intended to exploit the 
goodwill created by the Rosetta Stone Marks (and all other trademarks) in 2004 when it 
J In Carl v. bernaraJcarl.com, 662 F. Supp. 2d 487 (E.D. Va. 2009). the defendants did not use 
plaintiffs mark for their own financial gain. Rather they purchased a web domain bearing 
plaintiffs name and posted correspondence at the domain in an attempt to communicate with 
the plaintiff. ld at 491. 
4 
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affirmatively decided to permit its customers to bid on the Marks and ,,>,en again in 2009 when it 
affirmatively decided to permit certain customers to use the Marks in their Sponsored Links. 
(Dh"t. [04, Undisputed Facts ("UF") 16-17,24-25 .) In Anheuser-Busch, 'nc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 
the court held the presumption inappropriate where the defendant used plaintiff s mark faT the 
purpose of parody. 962 F.2d 316,321·22 (4th Cir. 1992). Google, of course, is not using the 
Rosetta Stone Marks for parody and its reliance on such case law is misplaced. 
Google then rejects as "inapplicable" all the cases cited by Rosetta Stone on the ground 
that they involve either competitors or counterfeiters. (Opp'n at 12.) Google misses the point. 
The fact that "Google does not provide competing or counterfeit goods," (id), does not change 
the fact that Google displays on its search-results pages Sponsored Links for counterfeit goods 
and allows those Sponsored Links to use Roselta Slone Marks as keyword triggers and in their 
text. Such Sponsored Links are presumptively confusing. See Phillip Morris U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Sha!abi, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2004) ("[CJounterfeii marks are inherently 
confusing."); Gucci Am" Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, 286 F. Supp. 2d 284,287 (S.D.N. Y. 2003) 
(,,[CJounterfeits, by their very nature, cause confus ion."); Fila US.A., Inc. v. Kim, 884 F. Supp. 
491,494 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (same). 
Google, moreover, completely ignores the two other circumstances in which confusion 
"ill be presumed, both of which are present here: (i) using identical marks in the same 
geographic area for the same class of goods or services and (it) using a domain name that is 
identical to someone else's trademark. (See UF 10·17, 19,24,28,35-37.)' 
, 
Although Google purports to address the use of the Rosetta Slone Marks "in'· post-domain 
URL addresses," (Opp'n at 13-14), it completely ignores the undisputed fact that many of the 
Sponsored Links displayed by Google contain the Rosetta· Stone Marks in their actual 
domain names. (Ur 35.) Moreover, although Google asserts that the use of marks in post-
domain URL addresses is functional and serves only to identify a unique internet address 
(cont'a) 
5 
6632 
[n shor'~ Google has not sufficiently rebutted the presumption of confusion that arises 
from its use of the Rosetta Stone Marks. 
3. Google's Use Of The Rosetta Stone Marks Results In A Likelihood Of 
Confusion 
Finally, Google argues that Rosetta Stone has noi demonstrated that Google's use of the 
Rosetta Stone Marks results in a likelihood of confusion. (Opp'n at 14-23.) Google's analysis, 
however is fatally flawed for several reasons. First, Google does not apply or even set forth the 
, 
nine-factor test utilized in this Circuit to assess likelihood of confusion. Instead, without citation 
to a single case, Google applies a three-factor test consisting of "intent of actual confusion [sic], 
intent, and consumer sophistication." (Id. at 14.) 
Second, Google's analysis is improper because Gcogle presents its Sponsored Links in 
isolation and out of context. For instance, in addressing purported "ads for genuine goods:" 
Google separately addresses cherry-picked examples of Sponsored Links for resellers, 
competitors, informational sites and sites unrelated to language education. (Id. at 15-24.) 
Google thus frames the confusion question in a piecemeal fashion that has no relation to the 
reality of what appears on Google's s"'!-rcn-results pages or Google's practices as a whole. 
Indeed, the cases cited by Google do not support its myopic approach and instead require 
that the Court allalyze Google's conduct in contexl. In CareFirsl a/Maryland, Inc. v. First Care, 
P. C, the Fo;uth Circuit stated that it must "examine the allegedly infringing use in the context in 
which it is seen by tne ordinary consumer." 434 F.3d 263,271 (4th Cir. 2006). The Court thus 
(coflt 'd!rom previous page) 
(Opp'n at i3-14), its own website states that "[t]he display URL path does not have to be a 
functioning page of your actual website." (Dkl. 149,4/9/10 Spaziano Ex. 44.) Google even 
advises its customers to make up a post-domain display URL to "complement your ad's 
message" by, for example, "highlighting the brand name." (Id.) 
6 
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concluded that it was not permissible to simply look at the marks themselves; it had to look at the 
marks "in the marketplace." [do Likewise, in Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, [nco v. i-800 
Contacts, Inc., the court stated that "a court must analyze the message conveyed in full context" 
and Umust view the face of the statement in its entirety, rather than examining the eyes, nose, and 
mouth separately and in isolation from each other." 299 F.3d 1242, 1248 ( 11 th Cir. 2002) · 
(quotations omitted); see also Lamparel/o, 420 FJd at 316 (determining likelihood of confusion 
requires "examining the allegedly infringing use in the contexl in which ii is seen by the ordinary 
CO/lsunur") (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
The entire premise of Google's presentation thus is fundamentally flawed - the Court 
may not look at each Sponsored Link out of context, but must consider Google's practices as a 
whole. Indeed, Googl.e's opposition is based on the faulty premise that Rosetta Stone merely 
cballenges specific Sponsored Links that appear on Google's search-results pages. 'Nbile many 
of these Sponsored Links celiainly do infringe the Rosetta Stone Marks, and help establish 
Google's liability for trademark infringement, what Rosetta Stone is challenging is Goog/e's 
practice of selling the Rosetta Stone Marks to third parties to use as keywords and in the content 
of their Sponsored Links, and then displaying those Sponsored Links when a user queries a 
Rosetta Stone Mark. In this regard, Rosetta Stone does not dispute that resellers, affiliates, 
competitors and informational sites call, in some circumstances, lawfully refer to Rosetta Stone. 
(See Opp'n at 15-18.) However, Google's practice of allowing all third parties to bid on and use 
the Rosetta Stone Marks is impeomissible as it results in a likelihood of consumer confusion. 
When Google's practices are properly considered in comext, there can be nn question that 
likelihood of confusion has been established. Rosetta Stone has established acrual confusion, 
which both parties agree is "of paramount importance" and "the best evidence" of likelihood of 
7 
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C()nfusion. (Opp'n at 18.) Ooogle's ov.n internal studies demonstrate that internet users are 
C()nfused (i) by Sponsored Links as consumers frequently cannot distinguish between Sponsored 
L,nks and organic search results; and (ii) by the use of trademarks in Sponsored Link text. (UF 
18, 20.) Google does not - because it cannot - dispute tRese findings. (Opp'n at 18-19.) As to 
the former studies, Google states without any suppol1 that confusion between organic and 
SpoDsored Lir>.ks has "nothing to do with whether users are confused as to the source or origin of 
Rosetta Stone's products." (Id. at 18 n.s.) Such .'5ertion flies in the face of Google's claims 
that its organic search engine identifies the most relevant sites in response to a user query. A 
user who is "unable to differentiate [the top Sponsored Links] from organic search results," (UF 
J 8), necessarily believes that the top Sponsored Link is the top - i. e., most rekvant - organic 
search result. As to the latter studies, Google says that they are irrelevant because U,ey did nOl 
address Sponsored Links using the R05etta Stone Marks. (Opp'" at 18.) The conclusions 
reached in those studies, however, were not mark-specific, and Google, in fact: relied on the 
conclus ions in deciding not to permit customers to use trademarks in Sponsored Link tex.t. (OF 
21-22.) Having based its 2004 policies on these studies, Google cannot now assert that they have 
no re levance to Google's practices. 
[n addition to the confusion evidenced by Google's internal studies, Rosetta Stone 
presented the testimony of Ooogie's current and fonner Chief Trademark Counsel Terri. Chen 
and Rose Hagan. At their depositions, each witness "'as presented "ith a Google search-results 
page for a search of "Rosetta Stone." Neither Google witness could tell that three of the 
Sponsored Links displayed on the search-results page were not reseliers of genuine Rosetta 
Stone software. (UF 43.) In response, Google asserts that these individuals cannot qualify as 
"actually confused" because Rosetta Stone has no evidence that either is in the relevant pool of 
8 
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consumers. (Opp'n at 24 0.9.) Yet, Google itself asserts that "Rosetta Stone's target market is 
better educated and has higher income levels than the general U.S. population." (Id at 8.)' 
Undoubtedly, Ms. Hagan and Ms. Chen fall within this target market. In any event, if Google's 
own Chief Trademark Counsel, who are well-versed in Ihe use of trademarks, are confused as to 
the source of the goods advertised in Google' s Sponsored Links, how can Google expect its users 
- irrespeclive of their level of sophistication - not to be confused? 
In fact, the record evidence demonstrates that Google users indeed are confused as 10 the 
source of the goods advertised in Google's Sponsored Links. Five individual consumers - each a 
college graduate and two with advanced degrees - have testified that they were confused by a 
Sponsored Link displayed on a Google search-results page when they conducted a search for 
"Rosetta Stone," leading them to do business ,Yith companies that they bl!iicvcd were sponsored 
by Rosetta Stone and to buy what they thought was genuine Rosetta Stone product but which, in 
fact, was counterfeit software. (UF 42.)' Relying on George & Co., LLC v. Imagination 
Entertainment Ltd., 575 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2009), Google asserts that in assessing the weight of 
the testimony of these individuals, the court should con,ider the fact that "more than 
, 
Google makes this statement in its "Counter-Statement of Undisputed Facts." Rosetta Stone 
does not agree with Google 's characterization of the facts set forth in this Counter-Statement 
. and maintains that they are not relevant to the issues presented in this case. 
Contrary to Google's assertion, all five individuals purchased counterfeit product. Although 
Diana Stanley Thomas could not locate the software she purchased at the time of her 
deposition, she purchased the product from sourceplazacom (Thomas Dep. at 20 :20-22), the 
same website from which Denis Doyle purchased his counterfeit software (Doyle Dep. at 
16:6-8). Moreover, although Steve DuBow could not confum at his deposition where the 
link from which he purchased counterfeit software appeared, his records show that he 
purchased the software on October 6, 2009 from bossdisli..ccm (Dkt. 149,4/9110 Spaziano Ex. 
53, DuBow Ex. 2), a Sponsored Link ahout which' Rosetta Stone complained to Google on 
October 6, 2009 (Dkt. 149,4/9110 Spaziano Ex. 43 at GOOG-RS-0310·697). 
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100,000,000 Rosetta Stone ad impressions were served since 2004." (Opp'n at 22-23.) 7 
ti"owever, "[w]ithout knowing how many~ or what percent of, incidents go unreponed, anecdotal 
evidence of confusion carulOt usefully be compared to the universe of pote"tial incidents of 
confusion. The rari ty of such evidence makes even a few incidents 'highly probative of the 
likelihood of confusion. ," Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc_ v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, no (3d Cif. 
2004) (quoting Chedpoint Sys., [nco V. Check Point Sojl>t'are Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 291 (3d 
Cir. 2001)) (rejecting argumen; that . 60 reported incidents of confusion was too small a 
percentage of the approximately 650,000 prescriptions); see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-
Rother Corp., 81 F .3d 455, 466-67 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[I]ndeed, we can but wonder how often the 
experiences related by the trial witnesses have been repeated - but not reported - in stores across 
the country.").' Moreover, contrary to Google's assertion, the "totality of Rosetta Stone's 
evidence" extends far beyond the testimony of these five witnesses (Opp'n at 23), and includes, 
as discussed above, Google's own studies, testimony and admissions. Rosetta Stone has 
established actual confusion. 
7 Google's statement is misleading because, among other reasons, the reported figure appears 
to include all of the impressions generated by Rosetta Stone's own Sponsored Links. 
& . Relying on th.e declaration afThai Le, Goqgle disputes Rosetta Stone', Undisputed Facts 40 
and 4 I, which evidence actual confusion, claiming that most of the complaints logged in 
Rosetta Stone's databases do not reference Google. (Opp'n at 16-17; Dkt. 152, Le Decl.) No 
explained in the· declaration of Jason Calh01L'l (Okt 106), the focus of Rosetta Stone's 
customer care representatives is on customer satisfaction - not determining \vhether the 
individual found the counterfeit sites through a Goagle Sponsored Link. (Calhoun Decl. , 9.) 
Likewise, Rosetta Stone's web-based system is not designed to ask customers about 
confusion or to determine if a search engine led the individual to the counterfeit site. (Jd. ~ 
10.) The "graphical presentations" prepared by Mr. Le are consistent with these facts. (See, 
e.g., Dkt 152, Le Decl. ~ 13 (showing that 86% of the Parature complaints logged between 
December 2009 and April 2010 had only general entries of"fraud" " r "piracy").) 
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Rosetta Stone, moreover, established that the remaining eight confusion fa.ctors all 
strongly favor a finding of confusion here. (Rosetta· Stone Mem. at 21-24.) Google does not 
dispute that factors 1 (the strength of distinctiveness of the mark), 2 (the similarity of the two 
marks), 3 (the similarity of the goods and .services that the marks identify), 4 (the similarity of 
the facilities that the twa parties use in their businesses), 5 (the similarity of the advertising the 
two parties use) and 8 (the quality of the defendant's product) all favor a fi nding of conf"sion. 
Instead, Google argues that these factors are largely irrelevant and that the court should insiead 
focus only on factors 6 (the defendant's intent) and 9 (the sophistication of the consuming 
public). As discussed below, however; even were Google correct in its unsupported assertion 
regarding the factors tbat are relevant to its practices, these factors also favor a finding of 
confusion.9 
With respect to intent, Google asserts that there is no "evidence in the record that Google 
intended to confuse potential purchasers of Rosetta Stone's products." (Opp'n at 19.) Google, 
however, intentionally entices its customers to bid on the Rosetta Stone Marks and to use the 
Rosetta Stone Marks in Sponsored Link text because Google knows that branded keywords, such 
as trademarks, result in higher click-through rates than non-branded keywords and that higher 
click-through rates equate to greater profits. (UF 30-33.) Google thus affirmotively - and 
intentionally - uses the Rosetta Stone Marks to drive internet traffic away from Rosetta Slone 
, 
Notably, the factors that Ooogle claims are not relevant to the Court's assessment of 
likelihood of confusion are those that are necessarily admitted by Google's practices: 
Google uses the exact same marks on the exact same search-results pages to permit its 
customers to sell the exact same products. Rosetta Stone respectfully submits that the faci 
that the exact Rosetta Stone Marks aro being used weighs strongly in favor of likelihood of 
confusion, thereby rendering the other factors of less significance. See BrOOkfield Commc '1lS 
v. West Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036,1056 (9th Cir. 1999) (where there is a "virtual identity 
of marks" used with the same type of product "likelihood of confusion would follow as a 
matter of course"). 
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and to the sites of Google's customers. GoogIe, moreover. certainly Hintended to capitalize on 
the good will associated with" the Rosetta Stone Marks. CareFirst o/Md., 434 F.3d at 273. 
With respect to the sophistication of the consuming public, Google simply ignores the 
record evidence. Irrespective of the education and wealth of Rosetta Stone customers, tile 
undi~puted facts demonstrate that even 'lsophisticated" consumerS are confused by Google's 
Sponsored Links: Rosetta Stone deposed five college-educated consumers who were confllSed 
by Google's Sponsored Links, and Google's own research demonstrates that search-engine users 
are unable to distinguish between Sponsored Links and organic results and are confUsed when 
trademarks are used in the text of Sponsored Links. 
C. The Functionality And First Sale Doctrines Have No Application To Coogle's 
Practices 
Although Google does not characterize them as such in its opposition, it also relies on 
t\'YO of its afIlmlative defenses in an attempt to avoid summary judgment. Neither defense 
provides a basis for denying Rosetta Stone's motion, First, Google argues toat "the use of 
trademarks as keywords is functional and tberefore not actionable:' (Opp'n at 13.) The 
functionality doctrine, however, has no application to Google's sale of the Rosetta Stone Marks 
to third parties: 
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote 
competition by protecting a firm's reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate 
competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature. It is the 
province. of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting 
inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time, 35 
U.S.C. §§ 154, 173, after which competitors are free to use the innovation. If the 
product's functional features could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly 
over such features could be obtained without regard to whether tiley qualify as 
patents and could be extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed in 
perpetuity). 
12 
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Qualitex Co. Y. Jacobson Prods. Co., fnc., 514 U.S . 159, 164-65 (1995) (green-gold color of 
press pads used in dry cleaning and laundry establishments was nc t fonctional and met the basic 
legal requirements for use as a trademark). 
Thus, in Ttaffix Devices, Inc. v . . Marketing Displays. inc .. [he Supreme CO\L.'1 concluded 
that the plaintiffs dual-spring design for road signs was functional - it proVided a "uruque and 
useful mechanism to resist the force of the wind" - and therefore was not entitled io trade dress 
protection. 523 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2001). Likewise, in Sega Enterprises LId v. Accolade, Inc., the 
court found that an initializa~ion code was a functional feature that must be included in a video 
game program in order for the game to operate on plaintiffs video game system and that 
defendant therefore could not be barred tram using the code in manufacturing video games for 
plaintiffs video game system. 977 F.2d 1510; 1530-31 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, the Rosetta Stone 
Marks are not functional as they afe not essential to the use or purpose of Rosetta Stone's 
products and they do not affect the cost or quality of those products. The functionality doclrine 
therefore is inapplicable. See Playboy Enlers .. 354~ F.3d at 1031 (finding that functionality 
doctrine has no application to defendant search engine operators' use of plaintiff's trademarks: 
"[tlhe fact that the marks make defendants' computer program more functional is irrelevant")." 
IU In asserting that "[t]his Court has previously held that the mere use of trademarks as 
keywords is insufficient to establish liability," Google rnischaractcrizes Judge Brinkema's 
opinion. Based on the factual record before her, which consisted principally of an expert ' 
survey that she rejected in significant part, she found that the "plaintiff has failed to establish 
a likelihood of confusion stemming from Google 's use of GEICO's trademark as a keyword 
and has not produced sufficient evidence to proceed on the question. of whether the 
Sponsored Links that do not reference GEICO 's marks in their headings or text create a 
sufficient likelihood of confusion to violate either the Lanham Act or Virginia common law." 
GEiCO, 2005 WL 1903128, at ' 7. She did not hold ihat Google's sale of trademarks as 
keywords is not actionable. 
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Google's reliance on the "first sale doctrine" to justify its use of the Rosetta Stone Marks 
is equally misplaced. (Opp'n at 15-16.) That doctrine is based on the premise that "trademark 
law does not apply to the sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark." Shell Oil Co. v. 
Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 107 (4th Cir. 1991). Thus, "a purchaser who does no 
more than stock, display, and resell a producer's product under the producer's trademark violates 
no right conferred upon the producer by the Lanham Act." Sebastian In!'/. Illc. v. Longs Di1ig 
Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073,1076 (9th Cir. 1995). However, "conduct by the reseller other than 
merely stocking and reselling genuine trademarked products may be sufficient to support a cause 
of action for infringement." ld. Here, Google and irs customers do more than "stock, display, 
and resell" genuine Rosetta Stone product under the Rosetta Stone Marks. The first sale doctrine 
therefore is inapplicable. 
.. .... '" 
Rosetta Stone has proved direct trademark infringement. 
II. ROSETT A STONE HAS PROVED SECONDARY TRADEMARK LIABILITY 
To prove contributory infringement, Rosetta Stone must prove that Google "intentionally 
induces another to infringe" or "continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has 
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement." {nwood Labs .. Inc. v. hes Labs .. {nc., 
456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). To prove vicarious infringement, Rosetta Stone must prove that 
Google and its customers controlled the appearance of the Sponsored Links on Google's s.arch-
results pages and the use of Rosetta Stone's trademarks therein. GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 705 
The undisputed facts support liability on ali of these bases. (Rosetta Stone Mem. at 24-27.) 
The record evidence establishes that Google inteniionally induces customers to bid on 
trademarked terms as keyword triggers and 10 use trademarked terms in the text and title of their 
Sponsored Links. (UF 30-33 .) Google does not dispute these facts. (Opp'n at 24·26.) Instead, 
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it asserts that it cannot be held contributorily liable for the infringement of its customers because 
there is no evidence that Google intended that its customers infringe the Rosena Stone Marks. 
(Id. a(24-26.) In so arguing, Google hides behind the facial neutrality of its practices - asserting 
thal because its tools look to historical data and algOrithmically predict search queries, it cannot 
be found to have "intentionally" induced its customers to infringe. (Id. at 25.) But the record 
evidence shows that (i) Google is aware of the infringing nature of Sponsored Links; and (ii) 
nevertheless recommends to al l its customers that they bid on trademarked tenlls as keyword 
triggers and use trademarked terms in Sponsored Link text. The fact that Google induces all irs 
" 
customers to engage in such conduct does not relieve it from liability when certain of those 
customers in fact infringe. 
The record evidence also i!stablishes that Google continued to sell t..i-te Rosetta Stone 
Marks as keyv.'ords to individuals who it knew or had reason to know were selling counterfeit 
Rosena Stone goods. Cf Tiffany Inc. v. 'Bay, Inc., _ F.3d ~ 2010 U.S. App. LEX IS 6735, at 
*41 (2d Cir. Apr. 1,2010). Specifically, the Calhoun declaration demonstrates that during the 
, . period September 2009 to March 2010, Rosena Stone repeatedly contacted Google to request 
that specific Sponsored Links be taken down on the basis that the sites to which Google was 
! } directing traffic were selling counterfeit Rosetta Stone software. Between September 3, 2009 
and March l, 2010, Roserta Stone notified Google of nearly 200 instances ofSpDnsored Links to 
counterfeit web sites. (Dkt. 106.) Attached to Mr. Calhoun's declaration was a spreadSheet 
reflecting the dates upon which Rosena Stone found a counterfeit Sponsored Link on Google, the 
l.;. 
datcs upon which Rosena Stone advised Google that the Sponsored Link was fraudulent, the 
domain narnes associated with each such Sponsored LilLie, the text of each such Sponsored Link, 
,-
and the date and substance of Google's response. (id) This spreadSheet demonstrates that 
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Google continued to auction the Rosetta Stone Marks to the same customers after Rosetla Stone 
had advised Google that tl1e customers were selling counterfeit product. 
For example, on November 16, 2009, Rosetta Stone advised Google that 
gainsoftmall.comlrosettastoneColorado was infringing Rosetta Stone's maIks. (See Calhoun Ex. 
D-79.)" On that sam~ day, Google advised Rosetta Stone that it had taken the infringing LilL< 
down. (ld) On November 17, 2009, howeveI, Google ag2in allowed 
gainsoftmall.comlroset'.astoneColorado to place an infringing Sponsored Link on a search-results 
page for a Rosetta Stone mark. (See id. Ex. D-76.) Rosetta Stone again advised Google of the 
infringing Sponsored Link and, en November 18, 2009, Google advised Rosetta Stone that it had 
taken the infringing Link down. (See id.) Then, on November 19, 2009, Google again allowed 
gainsoftmall.com/rosettastone [0 place an infringing Sponsored Link on a search~results page for 
a Rosetta Stone maIko (See id. Ex. D-74.) These racts establish that Google was supplying ilS 
service to individuals who it knew were selling counlerfeit Rosetta Stone goods. (See also Dk!. 
; 47, Rosetta Stone Opp'n to Goegle Mot. for Sum. J\.idg. at 21-24.) Because Google continued 
to supply its product to knO"'" infringers, Google is liable for contributory infringement." 
" In sharp contrast to the specific notice provided by Ro.etta Stone to Gongle, Tiffany's 
demand letters to eBay "did Dot identify particular sellers who Tiffany thought were then 
. offering or would offer counterfeit goods." Tiffany, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 6735, at *41 . 
!2 Contrary to Google's assertion, Rosetta Stone is not seeking [Q impose an affirmative duty on 
Google to monitor and enforce its trademark rights. (Opp'n at 27 n. 13.) Rosetta Stone seeks 
to preclude Google from selling the Rosetta Stone Jl.1arks to third parties. Nor would the 
relief Rosetta Stone seeks "render operation of Google's website impossible." (id.) Rosetta 
Stone seeks only to revert back to Google's pre-2004 practices - when Google pennitted 
trademark owners to object to the sale of their trademarks as keywords. In fact, as a result of 
its settlement of similar lawsuits brought by American Airlines and REIMAX, Google 
currently does not permit third parties to bid on "American AllIines" or "RPJMAX" as 
keywordS. 
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Finally, the recorn evidence demonstrates that Google controls both the appearance of the 
Sponsored Lire1{s that appear on its search-results pages and the use of the Rosetta Stone Marks 
in those Lire"'. (UF 29-33 .) In tesponse, Google argues only that it lacks an agency relationship 
with its customers and L~erefore cannot be held liable for lhe conduct ofits customers. COpp'n at 
28.) fn so arguing) Google too narrowly construes vicarious infringement. Vicarious liability 
arises not only when an agency relationship exists but also when the "defendant and the infringer 
'exercise joint ownership and control over the infringing product.'" GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 
70S . Thus, Judge Brinkema denied Google's motion to dismiss GEICO's vicarious infringement 
claim where GEICO aUeged that Google controls the appearance of the Sponsored Links that 
appear on its search-results pages and the use of GEICO's marks therein. Id Because these 
facts are established here, Google is liable to Rosetta Stone for vicarious infringement as well. 
III. ROSETTA STONE HAS PROVED TRADEMARK DILUTION 
To prove a dilution ciaim Rosetta Stone must demonstrate (1) that it owns a famous mark 
that is distinctive; (2) that Google has commenced using a mark in commerce that allegedly is 
diluting Rosetta Stone's famous mark; (3) that a similarity between Google's mark and Rosetta 
Stone's famous mark gives rise to an association between the marks; and (4) that the association 
is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark or likely to harm the reputation of the 
famous mark. Louis Vuilton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog. LLe, 507 F.3d 252, 264-65 
(4th C ir. 2007); see also IS U.S.C. § 1125(c)(I) (2006). Rosetta Stone has established these 
elements. (Rosetta Stene Mem. at 27-29.) 
Relying exclusively an the Second Circuit's recent decision in the Tiffany v. eBay case, 
Google argues that it cannot be held liable for dilution because it "does not use Rosetta Stone's 
marks to identify Google's 0"'0 goods end services." COpp'n at 28.) Unlike eBay, however, 
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Google in fact uses the Rosetta Stone Marks. It sells the Marks themselves to third parties and 
displays Sponsored Links on search-result pages when a user queries a Rosetta Stone Mark. 
Google thus engages in conduct that both blurs and tarnishes the Rosetta Stone Marks. In this 
regard, courts routinely have found dilution by blurring where, as here, the defendant has used 
the plaintiffs actual mark. See, e.g., Diane yon Furstenberg Studio v. Snyder, No. 
I :06cv1356(JCC), 2007 WL 2688184, at *4 (ED. Va. Sept. 10, 2007) (granting plaintiff 
summary judgment on its dilution claim where the defendant used the identical mark); PETA v. 
Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915, 920 (E.D. Va. 2000), aff'd, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001) (same). 
Likewise j courts routinely have found dilution by tamishment where: as here, the plaintiffs mark 
has been linked to counterfeit products. See. e.g., Diane V011 Furstenberg Studio , 2007 WL 
2688184, at *4 (finding tamishment); Am. Online, Inc. V. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 
(ED. Va. 1998) (finding tamishment). For these reasons, Rosetta Stone is entitled to summary 
j udgment on its tnademark dilution-claim." 
IV. ROSETI A STOI"iE HAS PROVED UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Under Virginia law, a plaintiff seeking recovery for unjust emichrnent must show that (I) 
it "conferred" a benefit on the defendant, (2) the defendant knew of the benefit and should 
reasonably have expected to repay the plaintiff, and (3) the defendant accepted or retained the 
benetlt without paying for its value. Nossen y. Hoy, 750 F. Supp. 740, 744-45 (E.D. Va. 1990). 
Judge Davis recently explained that the word "conferred" in this context includes situations in 
Il Google 's assenion that .Rosetta Stone cannot show that its marks were famous by May of 
2004 is factually and legally baseless. As a factJaI matter, "Rosetta Stone" was a famous 
mark in 2004. (See Rosetta Stone Mem. at 27-29 & UF 1-4 & 8.) As a legal matter, this case 
does not involve a situation where the defendant is using a mark similar to the plaintiffs 
mark on its own goods. Rather, this case involves Google's sale of the Rosetta Stone Marks 
themselves. Given that Gongle uses the Rosetta Stone Marks because they are famous , its 
attempt to avoid liability based on the date the Marks became famous is untenable. 
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which the defendant, without authorization, ta~es a benefit from the plaintiff even when the 
plaintiff has not voluntarily bestcwed the benefit on the defendant. See In re Bay Vista oj Va., 
file., No. 2:09cv46, 2009 WL 2900040, at '5 (E.D. Va. June 2, 2009). 
Google argues that it has not been' unjustly enriched because it "has not 'taken' any 
benefit from Rosetta Stone." (Opp'n at 29.) Specifically, Google asserts that because "[a] 
trademark owner has no property right in its mark beyond the right to prevent consumer 
confusion as to source of its goods," it cannot have taken a benefit from Rosetta Stone unless its 
actions violate Rosena Stone's trademark rights. (Jd at 29-30.) The cases cited by Google, 
however, directly contradict its assertion as both make clear that a mark owner possesses 
goodwill in its marks. See Preslonettes, inc. v. Cory, 264 U.S. 359,368 (1924) ("A trade-mark 
only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner's good will against the 
sale of another's product as his. ") (emphasis added); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Reclanus Co., 
248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (trademark law's "function is simply to designate the goods as the 
product of a particular trader and 10 protect his good will against the sale of another's product as 
his; and it is not the subject of property except in connection with an existing business") 
(emphasis added); see a/so George & Co., 575 FJd at 392-93 (recognizing that a trademark 
protects "the goodwill represented by particular marks"). Here, Google has taken the goodwill in 
the Rosetta Stone Marks and sold it to third parties for Google's own benefit. It thus has taken a 
benefit from Rosetta Stone. 
Coogle also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no record 
evidence that Google promised to pay for the use of the Rosetta Stone Marks. (Opp'n at 30.) 
The promise to pay, however, "is implied from the consideration received." Appleton v. 
Bonduranl & Appleton. pc., 67 Va. Cir. 95, 2005 WL 517491, at '6 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005) 
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(citations emitted); see also Po River Water and Sewer Co. v. Indiall Acres Club of Thornburg, 
Inc., 255 Va. 108', 114-15 (1998). Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Google took 
without authotization the Rosetta Stone Marks and made them available to third parties at 
auctions hosted by Google. It also is undisputed that Google derived considerable profits from 
the unauthorized auction of the Rosetta Stone Marks. The promise to pay for this benefit is 
implied in law from the unauthorized taking and subsequent sale of the Rosetta Stone Marks. 
CONCLUSION 
Rosetta Stone's motion for partial summary judgment should be granted. 
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